Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague because of definitional deficiencies. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of that suggestion peremptorily, saying only,
It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the statute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not sufficiently define or describe the offense of abortion. We do not concur in respect to this question.Jackson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 79, 89, 115 S. W. 262, 268 (1908).
The same court recently has held again that the State's abortion statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Thompson v. State (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1200. The court held that the State of Texas has a compelling interest to protect fetal life
; that Art. 1191 is designed to protect fetal life
; that the Texas homicide statutes, particularly Art. 1205 of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person in existence by actual birth
and thereby implicitly recognize other human life that is not in existence by actual birth
; that the definition of human life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Art. 1196 is more definite than the District of Columbia statute upheld in [United States v.] Vuitch
(402 U.S. 62); and that the Texas statute is not vague and indefinite or overbroad.
A physician's abortion conviction was affirmed.
In Thompson, n. 2, the court observed that any issue as to the burden of proof under the exemption of Art. 1196 is not before us.
But see Veevers v. State, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 162, 168-169, 354 S. W. 2d 161, 166-167 (1962). Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1971).